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Winter 2011 approximately $20,000 to track a single subject in an American clinical study, it only costs about $2,000 per subject in India. 5 Despite the existence of internationally recognized protections for participants in clinical research, some study sponsors and investigators have failed to provide participants abroad with the rights afforded to research participants in the United States. The sheer number of studies conducted abroad has led to a lack of regulatory oversight, putting some of the world's most vulnerable populations at risk. This article will analyze two particularly egregious studies in which internationally accepted clinical research protections were not available to foreign participants in studies conducted by U.S.-based sponsors. One such study (the "Guatemala Study") took place in the 1940s, but was just recently unearthed from long-forgotten archives. The other study (the "Nigeria Study"), from the 1990s, has been the subject of battles in U.S. courts for the last ten years. While research ethics have evolved significantly since the time of the Guatemala Study, the Nigeria Study and its aftermath demonstrate that more than sixty years after the Guatemala Study, international human subjects remain vulnerable and currently do not have an adequate avenue for redress through the American regulatory and legal system. This article will discuss these studies, and how they failed to comply with current clinical research regulations. This article will then discuss the shortcomings of new and proposed modifications to clinical research protection, as well as a final rule promulgated by the FDA and application of the "Maryland Model" to federal law. Lastly, the authors argue that the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") remains the best hope for protecting human subjects by providing a possible remedy for those harmed in clinical trials abroad.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 4
Winter 2011 with gonorrhea, and 128 were infected with chancroid.
12 While a direct causal link between the experiment and casualties cannot be established, seventyone (71) subjects died while the Study was conducted. 13 In addition, researchers drew blood from 438 children for further research.
14

A. LACK OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN SUBJECTS REGULATION
In their joint statement, Clinton and Sebelius stated that "The [Guatemala] [S]tudy is a sad reminder that adequate human subject safeguards did not exist a half-century ago." 15 The Guatemala Study was conducted at a time when clinical research was largely unregulated. 16 The Guatemala Study took place during the same time period as the Doctors Trial of the Nuremberg Tribunal, a response to medical experiments by Karl Brandt, the senior Nazi medical official during World War II, and more than twenty other Nazi physicians who were charged with conducting medical experiments that amounted to war crimes. 17 The Doctors Trial was conducted under American rules of procedure, prosecuted by Americans and overseen by American judges. 18 The Tribunal issued its opinion in August 1947, and J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 6
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Study. IRBs were not defined in U.S. law in 1946, and were required only after the Common Rule 23 was adopted and 45 C.F.R. § 46 was finalized.
24
Federal regulations codified basic protections ensured by IRB review, including minimal risk, 25 a positive ratio of risk to benefit, 26 equitable selection of patients that take into account the challenges posed by conducting research on vulnerable populations, 27 additional protection to those predisposed to coercion or undue influence, 28 and informed consent process and documentation.
29
C. THE USE OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
The Guatemala Study violated current ethical standards of clinical research by using vulnerable populations as subjects. 30 Specifically, the Study involved multiple vulnerable populations currently protected by U.S. law, including prisoners, wards of the state, and the mentally ill. 31 Prisoners were originally given "vulnerable population" status in 1978, and are now protected under 45 C.F.R. § 46.301 et seq. 32 The Guatemala 23 The Common Rule is also known as the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, and is the baseline standard of medical ethics by which any governmentfunded research in the U.S. is held. Various federal agencies have codified it in their respective sections of the C.F.R. See http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/common.html. 24 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 7
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Study, conducted in the 1940s, did not protect prisoners in the manner that is required of research conducted today. The subjects' incarceration and lack of access to the outside world likely left them more inclined than a free person to receive the research inoculations or to sleep with prostitutes. The risks involved in the research, therefore, were not commensurate with risks that would be accepted by non-prisoner volunteers. 33 Since IRBs did not exist at the time, there was also no IRB review of the treatment of prisoners. 34 Furthermore, the prisoner component of the Study did not constitute permitted research, as it did not focus on prisons as institutional structures 35 or on prisoners as incarcerated persons 36 or as a class.
37
The next set of vulnerable subjects in the Guatemala Study were wards of the state, originally given federal protection in 1983 and now protected by 45 C.F.R. § 46.409. 38 This research, too, would now be impermissible, even though it only involved drawing blood. 39 The research was not related to the status of the children as wards, 40 it was not conducted in a setting in which the majority of children involved as subjects were not wards 41 (i.e. it was conducted in an orphanage), and there was no advocate appointed for the children.
42
The last category of vulnerable persons in the Study was the mentally ill. While there is no particular section in federal regulations protecting mentally ill research subjects, in 1979, the Belmont Report of the National J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 8
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Commission 43 identified the need for special protections for persons with mental illness when they participate as research subjects. Specifically, it stated:
Special provision may need to be made when comprehension is severely limited-for example, by conditions of immaturity or mental disability. Each class of subjects that one might consider as incompetent (e.g., infants and young children, mentally disabled patients the terminally ill and the comatose) should be considered on its own terms. [. . .] Respect for persons also requires seeking the permission of other parties in order to protect the subjects from harm. Such persons are thus respected both by acknowledging their own wishes and by the use of third parties to protect them from harm.
44
D. LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT
Despite informed consent being "widely regarded as an ethical norm long before the 1940s," 45 the Guatemala Study researchers infected subjects with STDs without their knowledge or without obtaining informed consent. 46 Specifically, the researchers did not inform the adult subjects that the 43 See National Institutes of Health: The Belmont Report, available at http://ohsr .od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html. "On July 12, 1974, the National Research Act (Pub. L. 93-348) was signed into law, thereby creating the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral Research. One of the charges to the Commission was to identify the basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects and to develop guidelines which should be followed to assure that such research is conducted in accordance with those principles. . . . The Belmont Report attempts to summarize the basic ethical principles identified by the Commission in the course of its deliberations." 44 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 9
A Remedy in Sight inoculations were made with the syphilis bacteria. 47 In some cases, instead of obtaining informed consent, researchers provided cigarettes to subjects in order to obtain compliance. 48 In the Study, one PHS doctor corresponded to another, "I am a bit, in fact more than a bit, leery of the experiment with the insane people. They cannot give consent, do not know what is going on, and if some goody organization got wind of the work, they would raise a lot of smoke." 49 The PHS officials were concerned "about the morality of doing this in the mental hospital and about consent." 50 As previously noted, researchers also took blood samples from 483 children in the national orphanage without obtaining consent.
51
Rather than obtaining the informed consent of subjects, researchers sought cooperation from Guatemalan government officials and the institutions housing the subjects (i.e. mental institutions, prisons, or orphanages). 52 Researchers provided medications, medical treatment and refrigeration in exchange for such cooperation. 53 Also, researchers deceived Guatemalan officials during the experiments. 54 For example, the mental asylum officials were led to believe that the inoculums were drugs and not active sexually transmitted diseases. 55 In general, "correspondence between PHS officials demonstrates that they knew that they were hiding something and that these studies could not be done in the United States." 56 47 Supra note 12. 48 Garcia v. Sebelius, 475 F.2d at 6. 49 Reverby, supra note 14, at 23. 50 Supra note 12. 51 Reverby, supra note 14, at 13-14. 52 Garcia v. Sebelius, 475 F.2d at 4-5. 53 Id. at 5, 22.
54 Supra note 12. 55 Id. 56 
Id.
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A Remedy in Sight soldiers, prostitutes and patients at a mental hospital." 61 The archivists found no evidence of consent by the subjects.
62
On September 13, 2011, PCSBI released a report containing its findings, and PCSBI Chair Amy Gutmann stated that the Guatemala Study "involved unconscionable basic violations of ethics, even as judged against the researchers' own recognition of the requirements of the medical ethics of the day."
63 PCSBI concluded that the researchers in the Guatemala Study intentionally exposed approximately 1,300 people to STDs, and did not obtain the consent of the subjects before engaging in research. 64 PCSBI made particular note of the fact that many of the researchers involved in the Guatemala Study were also involved in an earlier study involving prisoners in Terre Haute, Indiana, and in that U.S.-based study, the researchers obtained consent from the subjects. 65 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 12 At the conclusion of the experiment, eleven (11) children had died, while others suffered a range of symptoms relating to meningitis, including blindness, lameness, deafness, seizures and disorientation. 72 One subject was unable to walk or talk. 73 While courts and other sources have yet to find a definitive causal link between Trovan and the deaths, at least some of the children died mere hours or days after taking Trovan. 74 A ten-year-old girl continued to receive Trovan for three days as her condition worsened, only to die while still on Trovan. 75 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 13
A Remedy in Sight as a result of the application of Trovan . . . any deaths were the direct result of the meningitis illness and not the treatment provided during the clinical study." 76 Nonetheless, an independent Nigerian report later found that Pfizer had seriously deviated from its protocol, compromising the care of the subjects.
77
A. FLAWS IN RESEARCH DESIGN AND EXECUTION
As the Nigeria Study involved pharmaceutical research, this section will discuss the FDA regulations governing human subjects research. The two sections in the Federal Register pertaining to FDA's jurisdiction in human subjects are 21 C. The Nigeria Study involved children as subjects, and therefore implicated 21 C.F.R. § 50 Subpart D. Specifically, the Trovan experiment was governed by 21 C.F.R. § 50.52, as it involved "greater than minimal risk but present[ed] the prospect of direct benefit to individual subjects." 80 The applicable regulation states that such research may involve children as subjects only if the IRB finds and documents that:
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Winter 2011 (a) the risk is justified by the anticipated benefit to the subjects; (b) the relation of the anticipated benefit to the risk is at least as favorable to the subjects as that presented by available alternative approaches; and (c) adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of the children and permission of their parents or guardians.
81
These statutory requirements failed to provide adequate protection for the child subjects in several respects. First, an IRB or ethics committee never actually approved the trial. 82 Pfizer did not have the Study reviewed in advance by an ethics committee, which is required of a sponsor of a foreign clinical study seeking FDA approval. 83 One Nigerian doctor stated that "there was no ethical committee at the time of the trial, none met, and no approval was properly given for the trial." 84 In fact, the principal investigator confessed to forging a letter following the experiment's completion, stating that the trial had been pre-approved by the IDH's ethics committee, and then backdating the letter to a week before the experiment commenced. 85 Pfizer allegedly paid him $20,000 to do this. 86 Pfizer then reportedly used the letter to justify the Study when speaking with the media, and also gave the letter to the FDA. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 15
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Pfizer denies these allegations, insisting that the company believed that proper procedures had been followed at the time. 88 Furthermore, the Study arguably violated 21 C.F.R. § 50.52(a), as the high risk of the Study did not justify the anticipated benefit to the subjects. Little was known about Trovan before the Study, as available data was insufficient and clinically discouraging. For example, the Nigeria Study marked the first time Trovan was being tested in children in its oral form.
89
Trovan had also caused significant side effects in animal testing, including liver damage, a degenerative bone condition, and other damage to joints and cartilage.
90
Researchers allegedly exposed the subjects to additional unnecessary and preventable risks. A Pfizer employee hastily prepared the protocol, completing it in just six weeks, as compared to a more typical time frame in the United States of about one year. 91 Researchers allegedly did not conduct preliminary tests to determine: 1) if the children in the Study actually had meningitis; and 2) if the strain of meningitis affecting northern Nigeria was responsive to Trovan. 92 They also allegedly did not screen out children who had joint and liver problems and did not switch them to the control group, as 88 
Id.
89 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009). However, Pfizer contends that dosing studies "had been conducted in both adults and children and showed that the drug behaved similarly in adults as it did in children before the Kano trial was conducted. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 16
Winter 2011 promised, if they were not responding well to Trovan. 93 Administrators reportedly failed to conduct blood tests and spinal taps called for in the Study protocol to assess the safety and efficacy of Trovan. 94 Following the twoweek experiment, Pfizer researchers and clinicians are alleged to have left the hospital without providing follow-up care.
95
The trial also allegedly violated 21 C.F.R. § 50.52(b) as the researchers allegedly did not present available alternative approaches to the subjects properly.
96 Specifically, claims have been made that patients in the control group were given only one-third of the recommended dose of the antibiotic ceftriaxone. 97 This would have rendered the otherwise FDA-approved safe and effective antibiotic therapeutically ineffective, reportedly in an effort to exaggerate the comparative effectiveness of Trovan. 98 Pfizer, however, denies intentionally using a lower dosage of ceftriaxone.
99
B. LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT
As described below, Pfizer investigators allegedly failed to obtain sufficient "assent of the children and permission of their parents or guardians" in accordance with 21 C.F.R. § 50.52(c).
100 Section 50.20 discusses the 93 Id. at 170. 94 Stephens, supra note 72. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 17
A Remedy in Sight necessary elements of informed consent. 101 The regulation states that the investigator shall provide: "[a] statement that the study involves research . . . and identification of any procedures which are experimental,"
102 "[a] description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject" 103 and "[a] disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject."
104 The Nigeria Study allegedly did not comply with these regulations. The subjects and their guardians purportedly did not know that they were participating in a research experiment. 105 Pfizer allegedly did not inform the children or their guardians of the risks involved or viable alternative treatments, such as a free, conventional, and effective treatment provided in the same hospital by Doctors Without Borders.
106
The regulations additionally provide, "information that is given to the subject or the representative shall be in a language understandable to the 101 For purposes of this article, the authors assume that the children are not of the age of consent, and are rather assenting to treatment, while the parent/guardian is consenting J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 18
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107 This allegedly was not the case during the Nigeria Study. Pfizer employees asserted that the nurses explained the specifics of the Nigeria Study to the subject's parents in their native language of Hausa, but did not fully translate the consent form.
108 It has been alleged that the guardians would merely look at the administrators' faces and ask them to make a decision, indicating that they did not understand.
109
Section 50.27 highlights regulations regarding documentation of informed consent. It states that "informed consent shall be documented by the use of a written consent form approved by the IRB and signed and dated by the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative at the time of consent. A copy shall be given to the person signing the form."
110 The regulations also state that the consent form can either be written, or in a short form indicating that informed consent has been "presented orally to the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative . . . [with a] witness to the oral presentation. Also, the IRB shall approve a written summary of what is to be said to the subject or the representative." 111 Pfizer researchers allegedly failed to obtain proper written or oral consent in accordance with these regulations. While investigators constructed a consent form for the Study that was approved by a local committee, which was useless as most of the subjects and their guardians were illiterate. 112 Pfizer could not produce any signed consent forms.
113 Although Pfizer alleged that "verbal consent was obtained" and nurses talked to the families, 114 Pfizer 107 21 C.F.R. § 50.20. 108 Stephens, supra note 72. 109 Id. 112 Stephens, supra note 72. 113 Id.
114 Id.
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115
C. ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD
Perhaps most striking was Pfizer's alleged engagement in fraud prior to, during, and following the research. 116 As of this writing, publicly available knowledge on the Guatemala case has not implicated those researchers in fraud. In Nigeria, however, Pfizer allegedly falsely represented to the FDA, in seeking FDA approval for testing, that Pfizer had obtained proper approval of the local government and the IDH's ethics committee.
117 Furthermore, a report later found that Pfizer allegedly never obtained approval from the Nigerian government to administer Trovan to the children and infants. 118 The director of the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control ("NAFDAC"), the Nigerian analog of the U.S. FDA, reportedly stated that his agency was not aware of the trial. 119 Pfizer insists, however, that it "relied on approval letters and exemptions issued by NAFDAC, the Federal Ministry of Finance, [and] the Federal Ministry of Health." 120 Pfizer is also alleged to have fraudulently identified its principal investigator. While Pfizer told Nigerian authorities that a Nigerian doctor was the principal investigator, an investigative committee reportedly later found that the doctor was only nominally the principal investigator, as American researchers directed the trial. 121 In fact, the Nigerian principal investigator 115 Shah, supra note 84.
116 "Fraud" and its derivatives are used within this article to mean "deceit, trickery, sharp practice, or breach of confidence, perpetrated for profit or to gain some unfair or dishonest advantage." See DICTIONARY.COM, available at http://dictionary .reference.com/browse/fraud.
117 Wollensack, supra note 85. 118 Stephens, supra note 75. 119 Id.
120 Statement of Defense, supra note 89. 121 Stephens, supra note 75.
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122
While the FDA regulations governing clinical research have provisions governing informed consent and protection of child subjects, there are no provisions explicitly protecting against fraud. In fact, as will be discussed below, much of what the FDA and others can do in the regulatory space does not and cannot address fraud. Therefore, the best solutions for human subject protection in this regard would be to increase oversight of the clinical trials where feasible, but more significantly, to provide a remedy in court for research subjects who have been harmed. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 22
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However, some have questioned whether the settlement was fair to the families of the children who participated in the clinical research. While settling for $75 million, the Nigerian and Kano State governments originally sought $9 billion. 142 A Connecticut attorney representing fifty-eight of the alleged victims recently commented that while in the final settlement Pfizer pays $10 million each to the Nigerian government, the Kano State, and the Kano State's attorneys, it only pays $35 million total to the 200 victims, meaning that each plaintiff gets only $175,000.
143 Furthermore, the settlement does not provide an in-court remedy for those injured in human subjects research abroad. A cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, discussed later in this article, could provide that remedy.
III. TRANSPARENCY-FOCUSED REFORMS INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT HUMAN SUBJECTS
Since the Nigeria Study, there have been several new and proposed modifications to clinical research protections, all of which have shortcomings. While providing some protections to subjects, these regimes will have little to no ability to prevent fraud and deficiencies in the informed consent process.
A. INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL TRIALS REGISTRY PLATFORM ("ICTRP")
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Nations through the World Health Organization ("WHO") in 2006, 144 the ICTRP's main focus was to persuade companies and institutions to register their clinical trials. 145 Through the ICTRP, the WHO standardized what information companies should publicly register before commencing a trial. 146 This information would ultimately constitute 20 key details, including information regarding funding and study design. 147 By creating a standardized public registry, the hope of the WHO is to create a climate in which funding sources will make more informed and prudent decisions based on the ethics of the researchers.
148
While creating a standardized public registry may theoretically have helped the Nigeria Study subjects by increasing transparency, the ICTRP fails to provide an adequate remedy to international clinical trials victims, such as those in the Nigeria Study, because the platform focuses on funding, identity of sponsors, and basic study design, not on the proper treatment of human subjects. 149 Most importantly, the ICTRP does not address informed consent requirements or protect against violations, 150 and it is only a voluntary guideline. 145 Id. at 109-10. 146 Id. at 111. 147 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 24
UN Health Agency Sets New Standards for Registration of All Human Medical
B. REGISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL TRIALS
Another proposal that would similarly fall short in protecting subjects is the establishment of a public registry of international clinical trials. According to one expert, a public registry "standardized and validated by a reliable source would be invaluable in improving data, trials and patient safety." 152 The Government Accountability Project ("GAP") suggests that this registry build upon the existing federal clinical registry. 153 Registration would require sponsors to disclose both positive and negative information, which would reduce the likelihood of sponsors withholding unfavorable trial information. 154 One proponent of this idea cites ClinicalTrials.gov as a potential model.
155
Some have criticized the potential effectiveness of an international public registry. According to the GAP, the current public registry in place does not list all clinical trials being conducted worldwide. 156 A drug company can still maintain unregistered trials, and fail to report unsatisfactory results with impunity. 157 Giving the FDA subpoena power would assist the FDA in bringing unfavorable data to light. 158 In addition, new legislation supplementing the FDA Amendment Act's provisions on clinical trial registration may increase the incidence of public disclosure. 154 Malkin, supra note 152. 155 
Id.
156 GAP Calls on Congress, supra note 153. 157 Id. 158 
159 Malkin, supra note 152.
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The ICTRP, discussed above, may serve as a model or foundation for such a public registry. However, the ICTRP's focus on the need to increase public availability of clinical research data is insufficient to solve the problems discussed earlier in this article. The ITCRP's proponents seem to believe, perhaps mistakenly, that the public will serve as adequate watchdogs and be able to quickly respond to ethical violations in the midst of epidemics, given the pressing need for drugs. 160 Lastly, because the major flaws of the Trovan experiment included alleged fraud and deficiencies in informed consent, and that hundreds of registries existed at that time, it is unlikely that the ICTRP or a similar registry could have guarded against Pfizer's misconduct.
161
IV. NEW AND PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE REGULATORY REGIME
The FDA recently passed new regulations that offer promise for greater protection of human subjects abroad. These regulations include a good clinical practice ("GCP") standard, independent ethics committee ("IEC") requirements, more informed consent regulations, as well as greater documentation and reporting of the study design. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 26
A. GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE ("GCP")
While the FDA previously had authority over foreign clinical studies by the ethical guidelines set forth in the Declaration of Helsinki, the 2008 rule now holds these trials to the standards of Good Clinical Practice ("GCP"). 165 The final rule defines GCP "as a standard for the design, conduct, performance, monitoring, auditing, recording, analysis, and reporting of clinical trials in a way that provides assurance that the data and reported results are credible and accurate and that the rights, safety, and well-being of trial subjects are protected." 166 The FDA further defines GCP as including pre-study review and approval by an IEC, ongoing review by the IEC during the study, and "obtaining and documenting" informed consent of the subject or her legally authorized representative prior to a study. 167 Further elements of GCP include 1) providing supporting documentation; and 2) if necessary, submitting to an onsite inspection.
168
B. REVIEW BY INDEPENDENT ETHICS COMMITTEE ("IEC")
The new FDA rule mandates that such trials be reviewed and approved by an Independent Ethics Committee ("IEC"). 169 The rule defines an IEC "as a review panel that is responsible for ensuring the protection of the rights, safety, and well-being of human subjects involved in a clinical investigation and is adequately constituted to provide assurance of that protection." 170 The final rule also clarifies that an IRB is a form of IEC.
171
According to the final rule, the applicant or sponsor must submit information including the name and address of the IEC, a statement that the 165 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 27
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IEC qualifies under § 312.3, supporting documentation to verify the identities and qualifications of IEC members, and a summary of the IEC's approval, modification, or favorable opinion of the study. 172 The applicant, or sponsor, is also required to maintain records supporting the statement of qualification as an IEC, in addition to the identities of the qualifications of IEC members, in the event of an agency review. 173 An IEC requirement provides inadequate protection for international human subjects. As discussed above, the Trovan trials were conducted without an IRB. Thus, the problem with the trial was not that there was not an IRB, but that reportedly, Pfizer fraudulently led the FDA to believe that there was one. 174 The rule's provisions regarding IECs do not provide a safeguard against fraudulent conduct.
This regulation lacks teeth given the shortage of FDA staff and small number of inspections worldwide. This regulation is also ambiguous. The IEC must review and approve a clinical study before implementation, but the rule does not specify the exact procedures required by the IEC. 175 The FDA is aware of and defends this ambiguity: it states that it did not articulate such specifics "because different procedures offering equivalent human subject protection may be followed in different countries." 176 The rule stated that the GCP standards in general, and the mandate of the IEC to review and approve specifically, "are and should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate differences in how countries regulate the conduct of clinical research, while ensuring adequate and comparable human subject protection." 177 While different countries undoubtedly demonstrate acceptable differences in how they regulate clinical trials, the ambiguity of this standard may lead to abuse. For example, accepting a multi-layered informed consent approach involving 172 Id. at 22,801-02. 173 
Id.
174 Wollensack, supra note 85, at 756. 175 73 Fed. Reg. at 22,807. 176 Id. 177 
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Winter 2011 different members of the community, while in one instance producing viable and culturally sensitive informed consent, would be prone to corruption in a different situation. The FDA should clarify what constitutes appropriate, informed consent to provide sponsors and researchers with clear boundaries. This might be accomplished by providing non-exhaustive lists of both acceptable and unacceptable ways in which informed consent practices can and cannot be changed to take into account cultural norms and understandings. These non-exhaustive lists would in turn give the FDA greater discretion as reasonably necessary.
C. INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS
The new final rule provides additional protections regarding informed consent. It mandates that the sponsor/applicant disclose to the FDA descriptions of how informed consent was obtained from the subjects. 178 This may increase transparency and encourage sponsors to properly obtain informed consent. Increased disclosure may also help ensure that the sponsor adequately conveys information regarding alternative treatments and the fact that the subjects are involved in a clinical study and not proven therapy.
The final rule also sets a high bar for when sponsors are exempt from obtaining informed consent. The rule does not require informed consent under certain limited, life-threatening situations. 179 In such a situation, the IEC must conduct its review prior to the study's commencement. 180 The IEC must also find that obtaining informed consent is not feasible. 181 Finally, the IEC must find either that 1) the life-threatening situation is "consistent" with those articulated in 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 or 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a), or 2) "that the measures described in the study protocol or elsewhere will protect the rights, safety, and well-being of subjects." 182 178 Id. at 22,801-22. 179 Id. at 22,801. 180 Id. at 22,806. 181 Id. at 22,816. 182 Id. at 22,816.
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Under the new rule, the sponsor or applicant must submit "the investigator's qualifications." 183 This may serve as a safeguard against fraudulently representing the principal investigator, as occurred in the Nigeria Study. Perhaps more importantly, the new rule adds additional regulation to promote sound protocol and study set-up and execution, including a comprehensive protocol summary, study results, and case records and additional background data regarding study integrity upon request. 184 Furthermore, the sponsor must submit documentation of how it monitored the study, and how the sponsor maintained consistency with the protocol. 185 The authority of the FDA to request "case records or additional background data" may also limit abuse, as it will allow the FDA to see individual case histories.
186
E. POTENTIAL ONSITE INSPECTION
The FDA's onsite inspection power in this final rule is particularly encouraging. However, it is questionable how viable onsite inspections are, given their cost and the lack of political support they will likely receive. International monitoring is currently not a priority of the FDA, as it does not even inspect 3,500, or one percent, of its 350,000 registered trial sites. 187 One commentator suggested that the FDA "be provided sufficient resources to conduct inspections on a global basis" to ensure greater human subjects protection abroad. 188 However, it is unlikely that the government can realize this vision given funding concerns. Despite the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") 183 Id. at 22,802. 184 Id. 185 Id. at 22,802. 186 
Id.
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189 the OIG admits in that very same report, "[w]ith inspections costing about $40,000 each and the additional logistical challenges of conducting inspections at foreign sites, it may be more difficult for [the] FDA to justify a foreign inspection."
190
Perhaps a viable alternative may be to shift the cost burden of onsite inspections to the host countries. One proponent of this approach has argued for host countries to strengthen their own regulatory agencies' monitoring of investigators and research, and to share that information with the FDA "so it doesn't fall on the FDA to be the police for global clinical research." 191 The OIG of HHS recently echoed this proposal, calling for the FDA to "continue to develop inspectional agreements with foreign regulatory bodies."
192 In addition, Congress could grant authority to the FDA to require that pharmaceutical companies fund their onsite inspections in part or entirely, perhaps in an act similar to the existing domestic Prescription Drug User Fee Act ("PDUFA"). 193 However, opponents of private funding for inspections of foreign drug manufacturing plants point out that doing so "will make the agency beholden to manufacturers and more apt to overlook production flaws." 194 A similar risk is possible in private funding of foreign study inspections, as the FDA may be less willing to be objectively critical during inspections given its source of funding. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 31
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F. APPLYING THE MARYLAND MODEL TO FEDERAL LAW COULD FURTHER ENHANCE PROTECTION
Congress could protect all human subjects of American pharmaceutical companies abroad by enacting federal legislation similar to the legislation passed in Maryland. Congress has yet to enact overarching regulation on all domestic human subjects research, which it has already done with animal research. 195 Human research subjects abroad are similarly not universally protected by federal regulations. They are protected only if the research is at least partially funded by the 17 federal agencies "that have adopted the Common Rule." 196 The FDA then provides additional protection for subjects involved in research obtained as part of an application for approval to market a drug, device, or biologic product.
197
The Maryland law, which became effective on October 1, 2002, mandates that all clinical research in Maryland comply with HHS and FDA regulations, regardless of whether or not the research receives federal funds. 198 The GAP has recommended that Congress extend protection to all human subjects in the United States, possibly by using Maryland's law as a template. 199 Congress could take GAP's suggestion one step further by subjecting all clinical trials abroad sponsored by American pharmaceutical companies to HHS and FDA regulations, regardless of whether the trials receive funds from these agencies.
Congress could incorporate other aspects of the Maryland law to further protect human subjects abroad. Most importantly, the Maryland model enables enforcement by authorizing Maryland's Attorney General "to seek 195 GAP Calls on Congress, supra note 153. 196 Id. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 32
Winter 2011 injunctive or other relief" if research is non-compliant with federal regulations. 200 If Congress chose to adopt the Maryland rule as suggested above, an analogous federal enforcement mechanism would similarly promote the efficacy of the regulations.
While promising at first glance, there are significant obstacles to Congressional adoption of the Maryland model. There may be constitutional limitations on the scope of the model, as scholars have commented that scientific research is protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
201 Furthermore, applying the Maryland law to the Nigeria Study would have been superfluous given that the Study, as established above, was already subject to FDA regulations. 202 There would also likely be a lack of political will in overseeing international drug testing not being funded by FDA or HHS. The fact that these trials are not receiving FDA or HHS funding would beg the question as to who would oversee these trials, and what that agency's interest would be in doing so. Federal agencies would likely be disinclined to oversee clinical trials where they had no financial stake. One option is for the federal government to collect fines for noncompliance, but fines would have to be significant enough to justify the costs associated with oversight.
V. NIGERIA STUDY LITIGATION OPENS DOOR FOR ALIEN TORT STATUTE REMEDY
The The Court of Appeals argued for a more nuanced understanding of the application of international standards to U.S. courts vis-à-vis the ATS. Applying Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 205 the Court of Appeals noted that a federal court can recognize a violation of international law and a cause of action under the ATS "only if a plaintiff identifies the violation of a norm of customary international law that, as defined by the sources of such law . . . is sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory." 206 The Court of Appeals found the District Court's application of Sosa's "sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory" test erroneous, as the District Court only looked at whether each international law referencing the norm is binding and has an express cause of action. 207 The Court of Appeals argued that, under Sosa, "[c]ourts are obligated to examine how the specificity of the norm compares with 18th-century paradigms, whether the norm is accepted by the world community, and whether States universally abide by the norm out of a sense of mutual concern." 208 Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court incorrectly determined that international law cannot be J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 34
Winter 2011 enforced through the ATS to prohibit nonconsensual human subject research, and reversed and remanded the lower court's ruling. 209 The 2009 decision suggests that redress in American courts for human subjects abroad is possible under the ATS because human subjects protections are universally accepted in international law. Several other U.S. courts have also taken this position.
210
The 2009 Abdullahi v. Pfizer opinion stated that the Nuremberg trials established the prohibition of nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects as a "norm of customary international law" which is recognized by "states throughout the world . . . through international accords and domestic law-making." 211 The Code states that "the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential" and that "the duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment." 212 Furthermore, the court held that the Nuremburg trials' "authorizing documents" and judgments established legal principles that became the "bedrock norms of international law." 213 The Declaration of Helsinki's, and the Nuremberg Code's long established history of influencing government regulation further suggested to the court that it carried substantive weight in laying the foundation of American human subjects regulation: "Congress mandated patient-subject consent in drug research in 1962 . . . in response, the FDA promulgated its first regulations requiring the informed consent of human subjects. Tellingly, the sources on which our government relied in outlawing nonconsensual human medical experimentation were the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, which suggests the government conceived of these sources' articulation of the norm as a binding legal obligation." See id. at 179.
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The Court also held that the Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the World Medical Association in 1964 and most recently amended in 2008, constituted a norm of customary international law. 214 The Declaration of Helsinki created twenty "principles of all medical research," including those involving informed consent and appropriate risk of human subjects research. 215 The court found that the United States and at least eighty-three other countries have incorporated the Declaration of Helsinki into their laws regulating informed consent of human subjects, 216 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 36
Winter 2011 action, is powerful evidence of the prohibition's place in customary international law." 221 Nonetheless, while the Second Circuit Court of Appeals argued in the 2009 Abdullahi v. Pfizer case that a corporate defendant may be tried under the ATS, the Second Circuit split on this issue in 2010 when a separate panel determined that the ATS can be used to seek redress against an individual but not a corporate defendant. 222 Until this circuit split is resolved, it remains an open question whether or not an ATS claim can definitively be brought against a corporate defendant, but one that trial sponsors should be aware of.
VI. NEW GUATEMALA STUDY CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT INCREASES PROMISE OF ATS REMEDY
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arises from the ATS, the ICCPR, and the Nuremberg Code, among other "laws, agreements, conventions, resolutions and treaties." 227 The plaintiffs rested both their first claim for relief, the "violation of prohibition against medical experimentation on non-consenting human subjects," as well as their second claim for relief, the "violation of prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment," on the ATS. 228 The first claim of relief incorporated the ICCPR and the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki, while the second claim of relief cited the ICCPR as well.
229
VII. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE ATS
As demonstrated by the recent developments mentioned above in the Nigeria and Guatemala cases, multiple plaintiffs are now seeking to use the ATS as a remedy for violations of internationally accepted protections/rights. In light of high profile cases like Nigeria and Guatemala, there may be a groundswell of support for a remedy through the ATS, which could lead Congress to take action. The United States Congress could guarantee a remedy for injured human subjects abroad if, through legislation, it clarifies the relationship between international law and the Alien Tort Statute. 230 Specifically, the legislature could either 1) adopt specific international laws as binding, or 2) merely recognize currently non-binding international law as norms for the purpose of creating a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute.
231
One solution is for Congress to adopt the ICCPR as binding law, and through the ICCPR create a right of action under the ATS. 232 Alternatively, the legislature could simply recognize the ICCPR's guidelines as norms, 227 Id. at 23. 228 Id. at 24, 26. 229 Id. at 25, 27. 230 Wollensack, supra note 85, at 770. 231 Id. 232 
Id.
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Winter 2011 creating an action under the ATS. Similarly, the United States could give plaintiffs a right of action against U.S. pharmaceutical companies by acknowledging the current "voluntary ethical guidelines [of the Nuremberg Code] as norms."
233 Binding American pharmaceutical companies to Nuremberg would be one way to hold them accountable for their protocols. 234 The Nuremberg Code is an alternative that appears to be the favorite vehicle for establishing a remedy under the ATS. Several U.S. courts have addressed the relevance of the Nuremberg Code to ATS cases relating to human subject research. 235 In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., the court stated, "the Nuremberg Code . . . was the result of legal thought and legal principles, as opposed to medical or scientific principles, and thus should be the preferred standard for assessing the legality of scientific research on human subjects."
236 However, the Nuremberg Code's universal restriction on child research may make it an unviable candidate for establishing a cause of action given countervailing U.S. policies, such as National Institutes of Health guidelines that require inclusion of children in all human subjects research, unless exclusion can be justified. 237 After all, data from adult trials is often unhelpful in developing treatments for childhood diseases, in which pathophysiology and toxicities may be different. For human subjects research involving children, Congress or the Courts could opt to create a right of 233 Id. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 39
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Once either Congress or the courts recognize a right of action under the ATS, Congress could then set up a voluntary plaintiffs' forum. Some contend that this forum should be set up in the United States, 238 while others argue for a forum in "any country where a pharmaceutical company conducts its clinical research" in order to avoid unnecessary hardship of plaintiffs needing to travel to the United States.
239 Establishing a forum in another country, however, could result in unintended negative consequences, such as dramatically increasing the number of lawsuits against American companies, resulting in increased litigation costs, and likely leading to higher numbers of confidential settlements. This option would do little to increase transparency, and could result in delays in the development of life saving drugs as well as increased costs for such drugs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Clinical studies in the developing world are commonly marred by 1) deficiencies in the informed consent process; 2) flaws in research design and/or execution; and 3) allegations of fraud. 240 As both the Guatemala and Nigeria Studies demonstrate, international human subjects, particularly those in developing nations, are vulnerable to harms emanating from these deficiencies, and currently do not have an adequate avenue for redress. ATS litigation represents a beacon of hope for harmed foreign research subjects, who, thanks to the January 2009 Abdullahi v. Pfizer decision and the U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent rejection of Pfizer's petition for a writ of certiorari, have the option of bringing cases in U.S. courts. The recent Garcia v. Sebelius class action has breathed new life into the viability of an ATS complaint based on breaches of international law norms, this time against a 238 Wollensack, supra note 85, at 769. 239 Shtilman, supra note 234, at 453. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 40
Winter 2011 state actor. Furthermore, a recent FDA final rule will provide human subjects with additional protections by strengthening the IEC and informed consent regimes and establishing a vehicle for onsite inspections. A new cause of action under the ATS, and a more robust regulatory regime that ensures informed consent, proper study design and execution, and FDA oversight appears to be on the horizon.
